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JUDICIAL REVIEW IN LOUISIANA: A BICENTENNIAL
EXEGESIS
By Paul R. Baier ∗ and Georgia Chadwick **
This court, and every court in this state, not only possesses
the right, but is duty bound, to declare void every act of the
legislature which is contrary to the constitution. The due
exercise of this power is of the utmost importance to the
people, and if it did not exist their rights would be shadows,
their laws delusions, and their liberty a dream.
—François-Xavier Martin
I. PRÉFACE: 1812-2012
No scholar of Louisiana’s public law that we can find has
trumpeted a “general provision” of Louisiana’s Constitution of
1812 that has since disappeared. This was a long time ago.
Louisiana joined the United States of America on April 30, 1812,
exactly nine years after the Louisiana Purchase of 1803—the year
of Marbury v. Madison. Jefferson doubted the constitutionality of
the purchase; John Marshall later sustained it. John Marshall was
Chief Justice of the United States in 1812. War with Britain raged.
General Andrew Jackson triumphed in the Battle of New Orleans.
But the Constitution triumphed over the General. This was the last
skirmish of the War of 1812, another Bicentenary to celebrate—or
to lament—depending on one’s view of the facts and the law. Here
is an early chapter, the earliest we can find, in the annals of judicial
review in Louisiana.
∗ George M. Armstrong, Jr., Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law
Center, Louisiana State University. Secretary, Supreme Court of Louisiana
Historical Society.
** Law Librarian of Louisiana. Executive Director, Supreme Court of
Louisiana Historical Society. Curator, Supreme Court of Louisiana Museum,
400 Royal Street, New Orleans, open to the public. The Museum’s exhibit cases
walk you through two hundred years of the Court’s history, in photographs,
portraiture, and memorabilia, from its earliest days in the Cabildo, built under
Spanish rule, ca. 1795, to the beaux arts magnificence of the Supreme Court’s
1910 building, now restored to its original glory in the heart of the Vieux Carré.
For a tour, call Georgia Chadwick, 504.310.2402.
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We mean judicial control by way of the Great Writ of
Habeas Corpus of the Executive Branch, of the Commander in
Chief—the judicial root, if you will, of Boumediene v. Bush, 553
U.S. 723 (2008), of late, the Supreme Court’s condemnation of
Section 7 of the Military Commission Act of 2006 as an
unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in
violation of Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the United States
Constitution: “The Clause protects the rights of the detained by a
means consistent with the essential design of the Constitution. It
ensures that, except during periods of formal suspension, the
Judiciary will have a time-tested device, the writ, to maintain the
‘delicate balance of governance’ that is itself the surest safeguard
of liberty.”—per Kennedy, J.—Chief Justice Roberts, joined by
Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito, dissenting.
Another 5-4, split decision. Binding on the President?
II. LE TEXTE
ARTICLE VI. SECT. 25. By way of a Bicentennial
exegesis we propose assaying the last general provision of Article
VI of Louisiana’s Constitution of 1812, the lost provision of
Louisiana’s fundamental law that caught our eye. It is the last of
twenty-five “Dispositions Générales,” to quote the French version.
It appears almost as an afterthought.
Here is the text of Section 25, precisely as it appears in the
English version of ARTICLE VI. General Provisions,
CONSTITUTION OR FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE
OF LOUISIANA, adopted January 22, 1812, quoted in its elegant
simplicity, center-stage, so to speak, echoing down through
contemporary legislative, executive, and judicial chambers:
“All laws contrary to this Constitution shall be null and void.”
Or, to quote the French version:
“Les lois contraires à cette Constitution seront nulles.”
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III. THE LOST PROVISION
Section 25 disappeared from Louisiana’s public law with
the adoption of the Constitution of 1845. It has never appeared in
any Louisiana Constitution thereafter. Why? We suppose that after
a generation on the books, by the time of the Louisiana’s
Constitution of 1845, it was generally accepted that Louisiana’s
fundamental law, voiced by the Judiciary, controls the Legislative
and the Executive Magistracies. François-Xavier Martin in his
painstaking HISTORY OF LOUISIANA, FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD
(Vol. I, 1827; Vol. II, 1829) blithely passes over Section 25 in his
detailed description of the provisions of Louisiana’s first
Constitution. More recently, Tulane Law School Dean Emeritus
Cecil Morgan in his little jewel of a book, THE FIRST
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA (1975), for the
Historic New Orleans Collection, draws the reader’s attention to
“some interesting aspects” of Louisiana’s first Constitution that
“deserve special mention.” He says nothing at all, however, about
Section 25. To us, it jumps off the page. It reminds us of John
Marshall’s immortal principle, “supposed to be essential to all
written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is
void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by
that instrument.” The italics, nota bene, are John Marshall’s.
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 180 (1803).
After two hundred years we propose a Bicentennial Minute
entry essaying the origin of judicial review in Louisiana. We throw
Bicentenary light on what is a vital, yet completely overlooked,
now lost, provision of Louisiana’s first “CONSTITUTION OU
FORME DE GOUVERNEMENT DE L’ETAT DE LA
LOUISIANE.”
IV. FRANÇOIS-XAVIER MARTIN, GEORGE WYTHE
Doubtless there was talk of Montesquieu’s Espirit des Lois
in Vieux Carré coffee houses in the founding days of Louisiana’s
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public law. François Martin, a jurist of indefatigable scholarship,
undoubtedly nursed himself on Montesquieu and John Marshall.
He hardly slept for all the books he read. He spent his nights
preparing his astounding ORLEANS TERM REPORTS (1809-1812)
and his LOUISIANA TERM REPORTS (1813-1830), to say nothing of
his night watches reading law tirelessly, reading law endlessly. We
can easily imagine François Martin reading George Wythe’s
monumental opinion in Commonwealth v. Caton, 4 Call 5 (1782),
by candlelight in his Vieux Carré lodgings. We are sure he read it.
Here is Chancellor Wythe’s renowned passage announcing judicial
condemnation of a legislative act, 4 Call 8:
I shall not hesitate, sitting in this place, to say, to the
general court, Fiat justitia, ruat cœlum; and, to the usurping
branch of the legislature, you attempt worse than a vain
thing; for, although, you cannot succeed, you set an
example, which may convulse society to its centre. Nay
more, if the whole legislature, an event to be deprecated,
should attempt to overstep the bounds, prescribed to them
by the people, I, in administering the public justice of the
country, will meet the united powers at my seat in this
tribunal; and, pointing to the constitution, will say, to them,
here is the limit of your authority; and, hither, shall you go,
but no further.
Call in his report of the case advises: “N.B. It is said, that
this was the first case in the United States, where the question
relative to the nullity of an unconstitutional law was ever discussed
before a judicial tribunal; and the firmness of the judges
(particularly of Mr.Wythe,) was highly honourable to them; and
will always be applauded, as having fixed a precedent, whereon, a
general practice, which the people of this country think essential to
their rights and liberty, has been established.” 4 Call 21.
Wythe’s biography is entitled, GEORGE WYTHE: TEACHER
OF LIBERTY (Alonzo Dill, 1979) (“In observance of the 200th
anniversary of the beginning of the teaching of law at the College
of William and Mary, 1779-1979.”) Chancellor Wythe also taught
constitutional law at the College of William and Mary. For a brief
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period of time one of his students at William and Mary was none
other than—guess who?—John Marshall.
What was John Marshall doing in 1812?—the year of
Louisiana’s sovereignty? We will answer this question later in our
Bicentennial Minute Entry.
V. BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, ESPIRIT DES LOIS
Professor Jean Brissaud, late professor of legal history in
the University of Toulouse, in his heroic book, A HISTORY OF
FRENCH PUBLIC LAW (1904) (IX Continental Legal History Series;
translated by James W. Garner) (1915), tells us of Montesquieu’s
theory of separation of powers: “The spirit of independence of our
old Parliaments, their opposition to the crown, and the example
(which is questionable) of England counted for much in the
formation of this theory.” But French Public Law severed the
Judiciary’s head with La Révolution Française. “The judges could
not meddle in the exercise of legislative power, either by means of
orders taking jurisdiction, or by preventing or suspending the
execution of laws; nor could they pass upon the constitutionality of
laws.” Brissaud, § 502. The Principle of Separation of Powers.
Assuredly to the delight of Justice Antonin Scalia,
Montesquieu insists that the judiciary should restrict itself to
applying the laws to particular cases in a fixed and consistent
manner, so that “the judicial power, so terrible to mankind, . . .
becomes, as it were, invisible” ESPIRIT DES LOIS, 1748, 11.6; THE
SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, Thomas Nugent trans., New York, Hafner
Library of Classics, 1949, p.156.
Ironically, Justice Scalia is hardly invisible on this side of
the Atlantic. Judicial review in Louisiana, to be sure, is not one of
our French inheritances.
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VI. IL EMPEROR NAPOLEON, GENERAL ANDREW JACKSON
The Civil Law celebrates legislation, “c’est mon Code
civil,” says Napoleon. True enough. But whence judicial review in
Louisiana? What enables a Common Law judge to hold General
Andrew Jackson in contempt? Judge Dominick Hall so held. This
was the fiery judicial climax of the War of 1812. Hall was the
United States District Court judge sitting in New Orleans. Jackson
ordered Hall arrested for issuing a writ of habeas corpus
challenging the General’s declaration of martial law and his arrest
of one Louis Louallier, a native of France, a naturalized citizen of
the United States, and a member of Louisiana’s House of
Representatives. Louallier crossed Jackson’s sword by publishing a
letter to the editor of the Courier de la Louisiane. The letter
excoriated Jackson’s exile of Frenchmen from New Orleans. “MR.
EDITOR:—To remain silent on the last general orders, directing all
the Frenchmen, who now reside in New Orleans, to leave it within
three days, and to keep at a distance of 120 miles from it, would be
an act of cowardice, which ought not to be expected from a citizen
of a free country; and when everyone laments such an abuse of
authority, the press ought to denounce it to the people.”
Louallier extolls “the firmness of the magistrates, who are
the organs of the laws in this part of the union, and the guardians
of public order.”
He concludes by saying, “[I]t is high time the laws should
resume their empire.” “[I]t is time the citizens accused of any
crime should be rendered to their natural judges, and cease to be
dealt with before special or military tribunals, a kind of institution
held in abhorrence even in absolute governments . . . .” Alcée
Fortier, A HISTORY OF LOUISIANA (1904), Vol. III, p. 155.
VII. JUDGE F.-X. MARTIN
François-Xavier Martin, one of the “natural judges” to
whom Louallier addressed himself, says of General Jackson’s
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explosive reaction to Louallier’s letter: “Man bears nothing with
more impatience, than the exposure of his errors, and the contempt
of his authority.” You can find this universal truth reported in
Martin’s HISTORY OF LOUISIANA, Vol. II (1829), p. 392; Pelican
Publishing Co. Reprint 1975, p. 393.
General Jackson ordered Louallier tried as a spy by court
martial. It mattered not that Louallier was a naturalized citizen of
the United States and a civilian member of the Louisiana
Legislature. It made no difference that Louallier sided loyally with
Jackson against the British, who had fled New Orleans. Louallier’s
letter to the editor was seditious.
Death was the penalty under Jackson’s declaration of
martial law. Jackson considered New Orleans his military camp.
Inter arma silent leges, as Cicero says. The General was above the
law. He was beyond judicial control, according to the
Jurisprudence of the Camp.
VIII. JUDGE DOMINICK A. HALL
Not so at all. United States District Court Judge Dominick
Hall had the last word—for the moment at least—duly reported in
United States v. Major General Andrew Jackson, No. 791, United
States District Court, District of Louisiana (1815). Jackson’s arrest
of Hall was held a contempt of court, an unlawful military act
against “the firmness of the magistrates.” The General was fined a
thousand dollars. Later, after his two terms as President of the
United States, the United States Congress at the urging of
President John Tyler passed legislation reimbursing Jackson in full
for the thousand dollar fine he paid, plus interest amounting to
$2,700.
Here, then, is the earliest chapter in the life of judicial
review in Louisiana, recently revisited as a highlight of the
Bicentennial of the United States District Court, Eastern District of
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Louisiana, New Orleans, on line at http://www.laed.uscourts.gov
/200th/main.php.
IX. SOURCES OF SECTION 25
1. ALEXANDER HAMILTON. Alexander Hamilton’s
Federalist Paper No.78 is a pretty good place to start. We quote
the relevant passage:
The complete independence of the courts of justice is
peculiarly essential in a limited constitution. By a limited
constitution I understand one which contains certain
specified exceptions to the legislative authority; such for
instance is that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex post
facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind can be
preserved in practice no other way than through the
medium of the courts of justice; whose duty it must be to
declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the
constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of
particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.
This from the original edition of THE FEDERALIST: A
COLLECTION OF ESSAYS, WRITTEN IN FAVOR OF THE NEW
CONSTITUTION, AS AGREED UPON BY THE FEDERAL CONVENTION,
SEPTEMBER 17, 1787, VOL. II. NEW-YORK: PRINTED AND SOLD BY
J. AND A. M‘LEAN, NO. 41, HANOVER-SQUARE, MDCCLXXXVIII, p.
292-293.
Hamilton’s No. 78 differs slightly, but significantly, from
Section 25. Only laws contrary to “the manifest tenor” of the
constitution are void.
This allows more flexibility in the joints of legislation and
keeps the judges at a deferring distance. James Bradley Thayer of
Harvard Law School dubbed this qualification on the scope of
judicial review, “The Rule of Clear Mistake.” James Bradley
Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 144 (1893). Today this
rule finds its voice most clearly in, say, Justice Breyer’s dissent in
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), or Chief
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Justice Roberts’s dissent in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723
(2008).
2. KENTUCKY CONSTITUTION OF 1799. Next, it is
generally said that the Kentucky Constitution of 1799 is the origin
of Section 25. True enough, but our exegesis would emphasize a
difference in text that warrants notice. ARTICLE X of Kentucky’s
Constitution of 1799 is essentially a bill of rights that, through
some twenty-seven sections, recites the fundamental rights of
citizens, including the “natural and indefeasible right to worship
Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences”
and proclaims “[t]he free communication of thoughts and opinions
is one of the invaluable rights of man, and every citizen may freely
speak, write, and print on any subject, being responsible for the
abuse of that liberty.” Note the latter limitation of free speech:
“being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.” The Alien and
Sedition Acts of 1798 come to mind. Justice Samuel Chase’s stiff
enforcement of the Sedition Act against James Callender, a friend
of Thomas Jefferson in Republican Virginia, is well known.
Callender published a book entitled, THE PROSPECT BEFORE
US, in which he called President John Adams a “repulsive pedant,
a gross hypocrite and an unprincipled oppressor.” Chase presided
at Callender’s trial; the defense attempted to argue the
unconstitutionality of the law.
But Chase, a loyal federalist judge on the Supreme Court,
thought the law pristine, pure, and certainly constitutional. On the
other hand, Thomas Jefferson thought the Sedition Act pernicious,
impure, and patently unconstitutional. As President of the United
States Jefferson pardoned Callender on the ground that, in
President Jefferson’s view, the Sedition Act violated the First
Amendment. The President would follow his own legal judgment.
Never mind Justice Samuel Chase’s opinion. Here is an early
instance of inter-branch conflict over constitutional interpretation.
We shall recur to this matter in a moment.
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3. ARTICLE X. SEC. 28. ARTICLE X of the Kentucky
Constitution of 1799 concludes in its last section as follows:
Sec. 28. To guard against transgressions of the high powers
which we have delegated, we declare that everything in this
article is excepted out of the general powers of government,
and shall forever remain inviolate; and that all laws
contrary thereto, or contrary to this constitution, shall be
void.
This section’s text emphasizes the fundamental rights of the
citizen; all laws contrary thereto shall be void. Judicial review, just
as Hamilton justified it in No. 78, is aimed at protecting the
expressed fundamental rights of the citizen.
4. THOMAS JEFFERSON TO JAMES MADISON
(March 15, 1789). Thomas Jefferson is on record to the same
effect. Writing to James Madison about the proposed Bill of
Rights, he opined:
In the arguments in favor of a declaration of rights, you
omit one which has great weight with me; the legal check
which it puts in the hands of the judiciary. This is a body,
which, if rendered independent and kept strictly to their
own department, merits great confidence for their learning
and integrity.
James Madison’s support of the Judiciary as a guardian of
the proposed Bill of Rights is well known (1 Annals of Congress
457 (1789)):
If they are incorporated into the Constitution, independent
tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar
manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an
impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in
the Legislature or Executive; they will be naturally led to
resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated
for in the Constitution by the declaration of rights.
5. MARBURY v. MADISON. Every first-year law student
can recite Chief Justice Marshall’s reasoning in Marbury v.
Madison in favor of the Judiciary adjudging the constitutionality of
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legislation. “Certainly all those who have framed written
constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and
paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every
such government must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant
to the constitution, is void.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137,
177 (1803). But who declares the repugnancy? Says the Great
Chief Justice: “It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.”
Of course, Jefferson insisted that the Judiciary keep strictly
to its own department. He thought John Marshall wandered too
loosely into Executive territory in Marbury v. Madison.
Jefferson always believed that each branch of government
should decide for itself the constitutionality of laws affecting it. In
other words, to him Judicial Supremacy was an anathema.
6. MONTESQUIEU. Ironically, judicial review in the
American Republic traces itself back ultimately to the Framers’
insistence on separation of powers, a morphed version of the Baron
de Montesquieu’s political theory. Recall Montesquieu considered
the judicial power “so terrible to mankind.” He had in mind the
French Parliaments of the Ancien Régime.
After the French Revolution the Parliaments were
dissolved. The judges were rendered eunuchs. “Of the three
powers above mentioned, the judiciary,” said Montesquieu, is
“next to nothing.” Not so here. George Wythe, John Marshall,
François Xavier-Martin—all gave voice to the Judiciary as
Guardian of the Ark of the Constitution. In other words, in
America the Judiciary is Montesquieu’s watchdog—over
Separation of Powers, as well as the Bill of Rights. Judicial
Review is born of both.
The doctrine of “division of powers,” as Montesquieu
formulated it, appears as the first Article of Kentucky’s
Constitution of 1799. Thomas Jefferson was its source, transmitted
by James Madison to John Brown to assist in the formation of the
Kentucky Constitution. THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, Julian
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P. Boyd ed., Princeton Univ. Press, 1952, Vol. 6, p. 283. In turn, it
appears as Article I of Louisiana’s Constitution of 1812; they are
duplicates. Here is Louisiana’s:
ARTICLE 1st.
Concerning the distribution of the Powers of Government.
SECT. 1st. The powers of the government of the State of
Louisiana shall be divided into three distinct departments,
and each of them be confided to a separate body of
Magistracy viz—those which are Legislative to one, those
which are executive to another, and those which are
judiciary to another.
SECT. 2d. No person or Collection of persons, being one of
those departments, shall exercise any power properly
belonging to either of the others; except in the instances
hereinafter expressly directed or permitted.
George Wythe justified judicial review in the name of
separation of powers. He held an act of the Virginia House of
Delegates, a pardon, unconstitutional where Virginia’s
Constitution required the concurrence of the Senate, which was not
forthcoming. Commonwealth v. Caton is the taproot of judicial
review in the American Republic, as we have unearthed it.
John Marshall himself while a member of Virginia’s
Executive Council was asked to remove a Justice of the Peace for
gross misdemeanors disgraceful to his office. In an opinion signed
by the future Chief Justice of the United States, dated February 20,
1783—twenty years before Marbury v. Madison—the Executive
declared that “the Law authorizing the Executive to enquire into
the Conduct of a Magistrate . . . is repugnant to the Act of
Government, contrary to the fundamental principles of our
constitution, and directly opposite to the general tenors of our
Laws.” PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, p. 280.
So too, judicial review in Louisiana finds root in the first
article of the Constitution of 1812, “Concerning the distribution of
the Powers of Government.”
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X. ON READING LAW
What would Justice Antonin Scalia say of ARTICLE VI,
SECT. 25? He would insist on reading its text according to its
original meaning. We had better repeat the text: “All laws contrary
to this Constitution shall be null and void.” What this means to us
is that all laws contrary to this Constitution are null and void. But
this is an exegesis of judicial review in Louisiana, not a review of
Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner’s new book, READING LAW, THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (Thompson/West 2012).
XI. SECTION 25’S TEXT
The text of Section 25 says nothing at all about which
organ of government, or perhaps all of them, has the constitutional
authority to decree a conflict between statute and Constitution. The
text says nothing at all about this. For the answer, we must look
elsewhere. Perhaps to history. Perhaps to THE FEDERALIST,
favorite reading of Justice Scalia. Perhaps “Es liegt in der Natur
der Sache,” as the Germans say. Or, to repeat Chief Justice John
Marshall’s exclamation in Marbury: “It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is.” 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803).
Justice Scalia subscribes to judicial review, to be sure, but
not the freewheeling nonsense of the Living Constitutionalist
Society. We commend READING LAW to our readers.
XII. THE NOTION OF A “LIVING CONSTITUTION”
Justice Scalia condemns the notion of a “Living
Constitution.” That is to say, a “living organism,” one that must
evolve with society or else “become brittle and snap.” Reading
Law, p. 410. So speak its advocates. Scalia’s response? “Sed truffa
est!” “But this is nonsense!” To the contrary (id., 407-408):
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[I]f the Living Constitution advocates are correct, if the
American Constitution should mean whatever each
successive generation of Americans thinks it ought to
mean, then Marbury v. Madison was wrongly decided. The
Members of Congress take the same oath to support the
Constitution that the Justices do. Marbury v. Madison’s
holding that the Supreme Court can disregard Congress’s
determination of what the Constitution requires is firmly
rooted in the reasoning that the Constitution is a law, whose
meaning, like that of other laws, can be discerned by lawtrained judges.
But what of law-trained Presidents? What of a Harvard
Law School President who thinks the Affordable Health Care Act
constitutional? The Constitution says nothing at all about why
Justice Antonin Scalia’s legal opinion should trump President
Barack Obama’s. The Defense of Marriage Act is unconstitutional
according to President Obama. He instructed his Attorney General
not to defend its constitutionality in court. The Congress of the
United States, however, passed the Act. Members of Congress, a
majority for sure, presumably judged DOMA constitutional
pursuant to their oath to support the Constitution. The Supreme
Court has yet to voice its opinion on the question.
XIII. A BLANK SPACE
Our point here is that the text of Section 25, however clear,
gets us nowhere. It is a blank space in our Bicentennial inquiry. To
be sure, we bow humbly to Justice Scalia’s “2. Supremacy-ofText Principle”:—“The words of a governing text are of
paramount concern, and what they convey, in their context, is
what the text means.” READING LAW, p. 56.
But ironically, the very power that makes Justice Scalia’s
opinion trump that of the President, assuming he has four votes for
his OPINION OF THE COURT, is nowhere to be found in what the text
of Section 25 means. Judicial supremacy comes to life only later,
after John Marshall, after Marbury v. Madison.

2012]

JUDICIAL REVIEW IN LOUISIANA

21

It is clear to us at least, if not to Justice Scalia, that “The
judicial Power of the United States,” as Article III of the United
States Constitution declares it, has evolved over time—in fact and
in law.
Thomas Jefferson in response to Chief Justice Marshall’s
subpoena duces tecum in the Burr trial invoked the prerogatives of
the Presidency, an early claim of Executive Privilege. He withheld
certain documents in the interest of national security. Abraham
Lincoln defied Chief Justice Taney’s writ. Richard Nixon
disgraced the Presidency, but he stiffly yielded to Chief Justice
Burger’s judicial rejection of his claim of Executive Privilege, a
claim that “he and he alone” is the proper one to interpret the
Constitution regarding the scope of Executive Privilege. The
quotation is from Leon Jaworski’s oral argument.
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), if not Cooper
v. Aaron before it, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), surely settles the question of
which of Montesquieu’s three branches tops the tree.
XIV. CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL
For our Bicentennial salute to Section 25, we should rather
invoke the immortal words of The Great Chief Justice, John
Marshall: “In considering this question, then, we must never
forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.” McCulloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 407 (1819). (Justice Scalia quotes this
line in READING LAW, but he mistakenly fails to italicize the “a” in
John Marshall’s “it is a constitution we are expounding” (p. 405).
Pardonez nous, Mr. Justice.
XV. IL GIUDICE SAPIENTE
We consider Justice Scalia Il Giudice Sapiente—from the
Latin “sapere,” to have taste or flavor; wise; full of knowledge;
discerning; often ironical—surely a fit description of the first
Roman on the Court. Paul R. Baier, The Supreme Court, Justinian,
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and Antonin Scalia: Twenty Years in Retrospect, 67 La. L. Rev.
489, 502 (2007).
Justinian himself would admire Justice Scalia. Il Giudice
Justinianus, another of our terms of endearment for Scalia, J.,
quotes Justinian’s Digest in his book READING LAW (p. 56): A
verbis legis non est recedendum (“Do not depart from the words of
the law”).
Justice
Scalia
considers
the
evolutionists’—the
contemporary constitutional Darwinists’—reliance on Chief
Justice Marshall’s grand dictum, “it is a constitution we are
expounding” to be absolute nonsense, at worse an absurdity, at best
a canard. “But far from suggesting that the Constitution evolves, its
whole point was just the opposite.” READING LAW, p. 405.
XVI. EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Quite to the contrary, our researches convince us that
Section 25’s vital significance, its Bicentennial meaning after two
hundred years, is not to be found in its text—after all it has
disappeared—but in the evolution of judicial review in the
American Republic. Section 25 shows that Justice Scalia’s horse is
dead. It has been withdrawn from il Palio di Siena.
Mea culpa, Il Giudice Justinianus. But let us move on to
other Bicentennial data.
XVII. TREATY OF CESSION, ENABLING ACT
Article III of the Treaty of Cession between the United
States of America and the French Republic of April 30, 1803 (8
Stat. 200) contains a promise that the inhabitants of the ceded
territory shall be incorporated in the union of the United States,
and admitted as soon as possible, “according to the principles of
the federal constitution”; the Enabling Act of Congress of February
20, 1811 (2 Stat. 641), authorizes a constitutional convention for
the purpose of framing a government and incorporating the citizens
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of the Territory of Orleans into a sovereign state. It requires the
convention to declare, “in behalf of the people of the said territory,
that it adopts the constitution of the United States” and provides
further that the constitution to be formed:
shall be republican, and consistent with the constitution of
the United States; that it shall contain the fundamental
principles of civil and religious liberty; that it shall secure
to the citizens the trial by jury in all criminal cases, and the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, conformable to the
principles of the constitution of the United States . . .
We see in the Treaty of Cession and the Enabling Act the
inchoate right of judicial review, assuring to the people of
Louisiana as their birthright the fundamental principles of
separation of powers and of individual rights. Marbury v. Madison
announced these vital features of the public law of the United
States of America on February 24, 1803, a couple of months before
the Treaty of Cession and the Enabling Act. To our minds, Article
III and the Enabling Act adopt by reference John Marshall’s
reasoning in Marbury v. Madison: “[A]n act of the legislature,
repugnant to the constitution is void.”
Certainly our research and exegesis suggest that the
principle of judicial review implicit in Marbury, and perhaps John
Marshall’s opinion itself, may very well have been on the minds of
the Framers of Article VI, Section 25 of Louisiana’s Constitution
of 1812.
XVIII. LOUISIANA’S MARBURY V. MADISON
Mayor v. Morgan, 7 Martin (N.S) 1 (1828), is Louisiana’s
Marbury v. Madison. François-Xavier Martin—assuredly,
Louisiana’s John Marshall—delivered the opinion of the Court.
The case is this. The Mayor and City Council of New Orleans
refused obedience to a writ of mandamus issued by a court of first
instance commanding the Mayor et al. to seat a person on the
Council whose election was drawn in question. An act of the
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Legislature declared that the City Council “shall be the judge” of
the election of its members. Judge Martin reasoned that if the
Legislature had the power to grant to the municipal corporation of
New Orleans the right to determine the validity of the elections of
its members, the district court was without jurisdiction to issue the
writ of mandamus. Held: The Legislature had the power to render
the City Council the “judge of the validity of their elections, and
prohibit courts of justice from interfering with its decisions”; the
provision of the Acts of 1816 in question was constitutional. Thus
the writ of mandamus was void. Morgan, the Sheriff, who seized
the revenues of the City in execution of the judicial orders, was a
trespasser liable in damages.
We commend Judge Martin’s full opinion to the reader as
an exemplar of Martin’s judicial statesmanship and the power of
his judicial poetics.
There is plainly an echo of John Marshall in Judge Martin’s
opinion in Mayor v. Morgan, 7 Martin (N.S.), at 7:
This court, and every court in this state, not only possesses
the right, but is duty bound, to declare void every act of the
legislature which is contrary to the constitution. The due
exercise of this power is of the utmost importance to the
people, and if it did not exist their rights would be shadows,
their laws delusions, and their liberty a dream; but it should
be exercised with the utmost caution, and when great and
serious doubt exists, this tribunal should give to the people
the example of obedience to the will of the legislature.
XIX. CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL, 1812
What was Chief Justice Marshall doing in 1812? We
promised to answer to this question earlier on. The case we have in
mind is State of New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch 164 (1812). It is
not mentioned in any contemporary constitutional law casebook.
We dug it up ourselves by leafing through the pages of 7 Cranch,
February Term 1812. This is what legal historians call original
research.
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Our digging shows the Great Chief Justice adjudging a
constitutional claim arising under a Treaty of Cession between
certain Delaware Indians and what was then the Province of New
Jersey, under a conveyance of land from King Charles 2d, to the
Duke of York. These Delaware Indians had claims to a
considerable portion of lands in New Jersey. The Act of Cession,
August, 1758, relinquished the Indians’ claims on condition that
the government purchase a tract of land on which they might reside
in perpetuity. The Act stipulated that the land to be purchased for
the Indians “shall not hereafter be subject to any tax, any law usage
of custom to the contrary, in any wise notwithstanding.”
Later on, in 1801, the Delaware of New Jersey wanted to
migrate from the State to join their brethren in Stockbridge, New
York. The New Jersey Delaware obtained an act of the New Jersey
Legislature authorizing the sale of their land. “This act contains no
expression in any manner respecting the privilege of exemption of
taxation which was annexed to those lands by the act, under which
they were purchased and settled on by the Indians,” recites Chief
Justice Marshall in his opinion of the Court. Thereafter in 1803,
the year of Treaty of Cession between the United States and the
Republic of France, and, coincidently, the year of Marbury v.
Madison, the land in question was sold.
Next, as you might imagine, the New Jersey Legislature
repealed the act of 1758, which had exempted the land from
taxation. Held: The Repealing Act “is repugnant to the constitution
of the United States, in as much as it impairs the obligation of a
contract, and is, on that account, void.” And more—per Marshall,
C. J. (7 Cranch 167):
The privilege [of exemption from taxation] though for the
benefit of the Indians, is annexed, by the terms which
create it, to the land itself, not to their persons. It is for their
advantage that it should be annexed to the land, because, in
the event of a sale, on which alone the question could
become material, the value would be enhanced by it.
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In short, in 1812, the year of Louisiana’s sovereignty, Chief
Justice Marshall was enforcing the Constitution of the United
States, viz.: “The Constitution of the United States declares that no
state shall “pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law
impairing the obligation of contracts.” Article VI, Section 20 of the
Louisiana Constitution of 1812 says almost the same thing: “No ex
post facto law nor any law impairing the obligation of contracts
shall be passed.” And, then, we know, there is Article VI, Section
25. We quote its pristine text one last time: “All laws contrary to
this Constitution shall be null and void.”
Chief Justice Marshall, if we may say so, is an honored
guest at our Bicentennial table.
XX. A BICENTENNIAL MINUTE ENTRY
We come full circle, back to the future, back to CASES
ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF LOUISIANA, EASTERN DISTRICT. FEBRUARY
TERM, 1815, 3 Martin (1813-1815).
We mean the clash between the General and the Judge
previously rehearsed. This time, however, we draw the legal
historian’s attention to the Minute Book of the Louisiana Supreme
Court. It plainly shows that it was Louisiana’s Judge François
Martin, not United States District Court Judge Dominick Hall, who
first trumpeted the authority of judicial review in the annals of
Louisiana’s public law.
Here are the facts, a matter of reported chronology.
At the opening of the February Term, Eastern District,
1815, a commission was read by which François-Xavier Martin,
then Attorney General of the State, was appointed a Judge of the
Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana, together with a certificate
of his having taken the oaths required by the Constitution and law,
whereupon he took his seat. “The din of war prevented any
business being done, during this term.” 3 Martin V 3 [529].
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A month later, at the opening of the March Term 1815,
before the Honorable Pierre Derbigny and the Honorable F.-X.
Martin, the Minute Book shows:
On motion of Mr. Duncan of counsel for the appellees it is
ordered that the appellant—to show cause on Monday next
the 13th instant—why the parties should not proceed in this
case notwithstanding the act passed by the Legislature on
the 18th december last, entitled “An Act . . .
We quote the minute entry of March 7, 1815. The case is
James Johnson v. Duncan et al.’s Syndics, reported in 3 Martin
530.
On the same page of the Minute Book, appears the minute
entry of Monday 13th March 1815:
The parties aforesaid having appeared by their attorneys in
conformity with a rule taken in this case on the 7th instant
& the arguments thereon being closed the Court took time
to decide.
Next, our Bicentennial Minute entry appears on the same
leaf of the Minute Book, this for Monday, March 20th, 1815:
The Court now delivered their opinion in writing on the
motion made in this cause on the 7th instant and ordered
that the same be overruled.
What is this case about?
Martin, J., explains the case in his report, 3 Martin 530.
Remember, the din of war raged. Here is the terse opening of
Judge Martin’s opinion of the Court:
Martin, J. A motion that the Court might proceed in this
case, has been resisted on two grounds:
1. That the city and its environs were by general orders of
the officer, commanding the military district, put on the
15th of December last, under strict Martial Law.
2d. That by the 3d sec. of an act of assembly, approved on
the 18th of December last, all proceedings in any civil case
are suspended.
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Judge Martin first addresses the argument of General
Jackson. Listen to the voice of Louisiana’s Judge François-Xavier
Martin—Bicentennial fireworks on the levee (3 Martin, 532-533):
We are told that the commander of the military district is
the person who is to suspend the writ, and is to do so,
whenever in his judgment the public safety appears to
require it: that, as he may thus paralyze the arm of the
justice of his country in the most important case, the
protection of personal liberty of the citizen, it follows that,
as he who can do the more can do the less, he can also
suspend all other functions of the civil magistrate, which he
does by his proclamation of Martial Law.
THIS mode of reasoning varies toto celo from the decision
of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of
Swartout [sic] and Bollman, arrested in this city in 1806 by
general Wilkinson. The Court there declared, that the
Constitution had exclusively vested in Congress the right of
suspending the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus, and
that body was the sole judge of the necessity that called for
the suspension. “If, at any time,” said the Chief Justice,
“the public safety shall require the suspension of the
powers vested in the Courts of the United States by this act,
(the Habeas Corpus act,) it is for the Legislature to say so.
This question depends on political considerations, on which
the Legislature is to decide. Till the Legislature will be
expressed, this Court can only see its duties, and must obey
the law.” 4 Cranch 101.
Swartwout and Bollman, you might surmise, is the voice of
John Marshall.
Thus, John Marshall is brought home to our Bicentennial
table as a surprise guest. The Great Chief Justice is here courtesy
of Louisiana’s Great Jurist François Martin. It is a nice touch to
our way of seeing things that John Marshall and F.-X. Martin’s
marble busts face each other, today, after two hundred years,
guarding the portal to the Louisiana Supreme Court Chamber,
fourth floor, 400 Royal Street, in the heart of the Vieux Carré—
open to the public.
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Of course Judge Martin sustained the act of the Louisiana
Legislature suspending all judicial proceedings during the War of
1812, against the claim that the act impairs the obligation of
contracts (3 Martin, 542, et seq.)
It does not, however, necessarily follow that an act called
for by other circumstances, than the apparent necessity of
relieving debtors, one of the consequences of which is
nevertheless to work some delay in the prosecution of suits,
and, consequently to retard the recovery and payment of
debts, must always be declared unconstitutional.
One thinks of our contemporary Louisiana Legislature
likewise suspending prescription after Hurricane Katrina. Nothing
unconstitutional about that.
Now notice, please, that Judge Martin first takes up Major
General Jackson’s claim that his declaration of Martial Law trumps
the Great Writ of Habeas Corpus. Why do that? The Legislature
has constitutionally suspended judicial proceedings. Why address
the General’s claim? The answer lies in what scholars call “judicial
statesmanship.” Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v.
Madison comes to mind. He addressed jurisdiction last. So too,
Martin.
Here is the closing part of Judge Martin’s rejection of
Major General Jackson’s claim (3 Martin 537): “How preposterous
then the idea that a military commander may, by his own authority,
destroy the tribunal established by law as the asylum of those
oppressed by military despotism!”

We reach the end of our Bicentennial sojourn, a final
minute entry.
The Minute Book of the Louisiana Supreme Court shows
that Judge Martin rendered on Monday, March 20, 1815.
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On the other hand—take note ye legal historians—the
contempt proceedings against Major General Andrew Jackson, No.
791, commenced the next day, March 21, 1815. John Dick, the
United States Attorney, was anxious to initiate contempt
proceedings against General Jackson; “but Hall insisted on a few
days being exclusively given to the manifestation of the joyous
feelings, which termination of the war excited. He did not yield to
Dick’s wishes till the 21st.” François Xavier Martin, HISTORY OF
LOUISIANA, Vol. II (1829), p. 416; Pelican Publishing Co. Reprint
1975, p. 405. Amazingly, our Bicentennial Minute Entry shows
that Judge Martin appears first in the Chronology of Judicial
Review in Louisiana.
Judge Martin himself, in his LOUISIANA TERM REPORTS,
appends a note (3 Martin 557) to his report of Johnson v. Duncan
et al.’s Syndics. We leave the last word to Reporter F.-X. Martin—
his enduring gift to the American Republic: “THE doctrine
established, in the first part of the opinion of the Court, in the
above case, is corroborated by the decision of the District Court of
the United States for the Louisiana District, in the case of United
States vs. Jackson, in which the defendant, having acted in
opposition to it, was fined $1000.” (Our Bicentennial emphasis—
corroborated.)
Requiescat in pace, F.-X. Martin.

